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Abstract 
We develop a simple model of a speculative housing market in which the demand for 
houses is influenced by expectations about future housing prices. Guided by empirical 
evidence, agents rely on extrapolative and regressive forecasting rules to form their 
expectations. The relative importance of these competing views evolves over time, 
subject to market circumstances. As it turns out, the dynamics of our model is driven by 
a two-dimensional nonlinear map which may display irregular boom and bust housing 
price cycles, as repeatedly observed in many actual markets. However, we also find that 
speculation may be a source of both stability and instability. 
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  1Introduction 
As documented by Shiller (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008), although boom and bust home 
price cycles have occurred for centuries, the recent boom-bust development seems to 
dwarf anything seen before. Since the late 1990s, dramatic home price rallies have been 
observed in cities in countries such as Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Ireland, 
Italy, Korea, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Some of these 
price movements can be called spectacular. From 1996 to 2008, for instance, real home 
prices in London nearly tripled. Another impressive example concerns Las Vegas, 
where real home prices increased by 10 percent in 2003, followed by a 49 percent 
increase in 2004. For the United States as a whole, real home prices increased by 85 
percent between 1997 and 2006. Then the United States’ housing market burst and 
policy makers around the world are currently facing severe macroeconomic problems.  
Shiller furthermore argues that this dramatic price increase is hard to explain 
from an economic point of view since economic fundamentals such as population 
growth, construction costs, interest rates or real rents do not match up with the observed 
home price increases. It is quite important to note that the boom of the early 2000s 
across cities and countries suggests that something very broad and general has been at 
work. This development cannot therefore be linked to factors specific to any of these 
markets. Shiller concludes that speculative thinking among investors, the use of 
heuristics such as extrapolative expectations, market psychology in the form of 
optimism and pessimism, herd behavior and social contagion of new ideas (new era 
thinking), and positive feedback dynamics are elements that play an important role in 
determining housing prices.  
  2The goal of our paper is to develop a simple model of a speculative housing 
market to account for these observations. Our approach is inspired by recent work on 
agent-based financial market models (see Hommes 2006 and LeBaron 2006 for 
comprehensive surveys). In these models, the dynamics of financial markets depends on 
the expectation formation of boundedly rational heterogeneous interacting agents. As 
indicated by a number of empirical papers (summarized in Menkhoff and Taylor 2007), 
financial market participants rely on technical and fundamental trading rules when they 
determine their orders. Note that extrapolating technical trading rules add a positive 
feedback to the dynamics of financial markets and thus tend to be destabilizing. By 
predicting some kind of mean reversion, the effect of fundamental analysis is likely to 
be stabilizing. Within agent-based financial market models, the impact of these rules is 
usually time-varying – and it is precisely this that may give rise to complex endogenous 
dynamics. 
For instance, in the models of Kirman (1991, 1993) and Lux (1995, 1997, 1998), 
agents switch between technical and fundamental analysis due to a herding mechanism, 
leading to periods where markets are relatively stable (dominance of fundamental 
analysis) or unstable (dominance of technical analysis). In Brock and Hommes (1997, 
1998), the agents select their trading strategies with respect to their past profitability, i.e. 
this type of model incorporates an evolutionary learning process. Again, endogenous 
competition between trading strategies may lead to complex price dynamics. Other 
influential models include Day and Huang (1990), Chiarella (1992), de Grauwe et al. 
(1993), Chiarella et al. (2002), Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) and de Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2006). 
  3  Such speculative forces are essential to our model. As pointed out by Shiller 
(2008), the same forces of human psychology that drive international financial markets 
also have the potential to affect other markets. In particular, this seems to be true for 
housing markets. Note that by now ample empirical evidence exists to show that human 
agents generally act in a boundedly rational manner (Kahneman et al. 1986, Smith 
1991). Moreover, in many situations people seem to rely on rather simple heuristic 
principles when asked to forecast economic variables (Hommes et al. 2005, Heemeijer 
et al. 2008). The model we develop in this paper may thus be regarded as a stylized 
mathematical representation of what is going on in speculative housing markets. 
General theoretical and empirical evidence on (nonlinear) speculative bubbles is, for 
instance, provided by Rosser (1997, 2000).  
The structure of our setup is as follows. We assume that housing prices adjust 
with respect to excess demand in the usual way. The supply of houses is determined by 
the depreciation of houses and new constructions, which, in turn, depend positively on 
housing prices. We discriminate between real and speculative demand for houses. As 
usual, real demand for houses depends negatively on housing prices. Speculative 
demand for houses is caused by agents’ expected future housing prices. For simplicity, 
agents rely on only two heuristics when they make their predictions. Some agents 
believe that housing prices will return to a long-run fundamental steady state. However, 
other agents speculate on the persistence of bull and bear markets. The relative 
importance of these competing heuristics is due to market circumstances. To be precise, 
we assume that the more housing prices deviate from the long-run fundamental steady 
state, the more agents are convinced that some kind of mean reversion is about to set in. 
The underlying argument is that agents are aware that any bubble will ultimately burst, 
  4a situation where mean reversion rules predict the direction of the market movement 
correctly. A related rule selection scenario is used, for instance, in He and Westerhoff 
(2005) to understand the cyclical behavior of commodity prices.  
  The dynamics of our model is due to a two-dimensional nonlinear discrete-time 
dynamical system. We analytically show that our model may have up to three fixed 
points. Besides a so-called long-run fundamental steady state, two further steady states 
may also exist: one located below and one above this value. We are also able to 
determine the parameter space in which the long-run fundamental steady state is locally 
asymptotically stable. Interestingly, the impact of speculation on the stability of the 
housing market is ambiguous. There are parameter combinations where speculative 
forces stabilize an otherwise unstable fixed point (via a so-called subcritical flip 
bifurcation). However, for other possibly more realistic parameter combinations, the 
impact of speculation is destabilizing. The long-run fundamental steady state of our 
model may lose its stability via a so-called pitchfork bifurcation, after which two new 
nonfundamental steady states emerge, or via a so-called Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, 
after which (quasi-)periodic housing price dynamics set in. The latter scenario becomes 
more likely, the lower the rate of depreciation is. Finally, we present some numerical 
examples of boom and bust housing price cycles. These price paths appear to be quite 
irregular since both real and speculative forces jointly impact on the formation of 
housing prices and, in turn, realized prices affect agents’ demand and supply decisions. 
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a simple housing 
market model in which speculative forces are absent. In section 3, the model is extended 
and includes the expectation formation behavior of heterogeneous agents. Section 4 
concludes our paper. A number of results are derived in the appendix.  
  52 The model without speculation 
In this section, we first present our basic housing market model without speculative 
activity. We also characterize the dynamical system of our model which drives housing 
prices and the stock of houses, i.e. the model’s two state variables. 
 
2.1 Setup 
Housing prices evolve with respect to demand and supply. Using a standard linear price 
adjustment function, housing price   in period  P 1 + t  is modeled as 
) ( 1 t t t t S D a P P − + = + ,                                                                                                 (1) 
where   is a price adjustment parameter and   and   stand for the total demand 
and total supply of houses, respectively. Obviously, housing prices increase if demand 
exceeds supply, and vice versa. Without loss of generality, we set the scaling parameter 
. 
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where   is the real demand for houses and   is the speculative demand for houses.  R
t D S
t D
The real demand for houses is expressed as 
t
R
t cP b D − = .                                                                                                               (3) 
Parameters   and c are both positive. As usual, demand depends negatively on the 





The supply of houses is given as 
  6t t t t eP S d S S + − − = − − 1 1 ) 1 ( .                                                                                         (4) 
The second term on the right-hand side captures the depreciation of houses, where the 
rate of depreciation   is limited to  ) 1 ( d − 1 1 0 < − < d . The third term stands for the 
construction of new houses. Since  , (4) states that the higher the price, the more 
new houses are built.  
0 > e
A few clarifying comments may be pertinent. Note that   and   are stock 
variables. The total supply of houses   thus also indicates the total stock of houses. 
Similarly,   represents the total demand for houses, or, put differently, the desired 
holding of houses. In the price adjustment equation (1), we match – in each time step – 





2.2 Dynamical system, fixed point and stability analysis 
Recall that   and  . Introducing the auxiliary variable  , it is 
possible to reduce (1)-(4) to  
0 = S
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which is a two-dimensional discrete-time linear dynamical system.  
Inserting  Z Z Z t t = = +1  and  P P P t t = = +1  into (5), we obtain the model’s 
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It follows that P  and Z  are always positive. In the following, we call P the long-run 
fundamental steady state of our model, or simply the fundamental value. As revealed by 
(7), an increase in parameter b leads to an increase in the fundamental value, while an 
increase in parameters e,   and   yields the opposite, which is, of course, in 
agreement with common economic sense. 
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where  d e c tr + − − =1  and  ) 1 ( det c d − =  denote the trace and the determinant of  , 
respectively. The fixed point of the linear model (5) is globally asymptotically stable if 
the following three conditions jointly hold (see, e.g. Medio and Lines 2001 and 
Gandolfo 2005): (i)  , (ii) 
J
0 det 1 > + +tr 0 det 1 > + −tr  and (iii)  0 det 1 > − . Applying 
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and 
0 ) 1 ( > + − e d c
0 1 > + − cd d .                                                                                                            (11) 
Note that the latter two conditions are always true. Inequality (9) implies that the fixed 
point of our model may lose its stability when parameter c increases, parameter d  
decreases and parameter e increases. The stability domain of the fixed point is 
independent of parameter b. Again, this is consistent with economic intuition. 
 
  83 The model with speculation 
Now we are ready to include speculative activity in our model. Afterwards, in 
subsection 3.2, we derive the model’s dynamical system, its fixed points and the 
conditions for their local asymptotically stability. Section 3 ends with a few numerical 
examples of housing price bubbles and crashes.  
 
3.1 Speculative demand 
We assume that speculative forces entail an extrapolating and a mean reverting 
component. The relative importance of both components is time-varying since agents 
change their forecasting rules with respect to market circumstances. For simplicity, we 
do not track the activities of individual agents in this paper. Our approach may therefore 
also be interpreted as a model with a boundedly rational representative agent who uses a 
nonlinear mix of different forecasting rules. The representative agent then updates 
his/her mix in each time step. Note also that the total demand for houses in our model is 
simply given as the sum of the real demand for houses and the speculative demand for 
houses. For instance, if the speculative demand for houses is negative (positive), this 
decreases (increases) the total demand for houses. A negative speculative demand is not 
interpreted as short selling of houses in our model but as a correction term of the agents’ 
real demand for houses. In our numerical examination we have verified that the total 
demand for houses is positive in any time step.  
Speculative demand driven by the extrapolating component is formalized as 
) ( P P f D t
E
t − = .                                                                                                       (12) 
The reaction parameter   is positive. When the housing price is above (below) its 
fundamental value, (12) implies that its followers optimistically (pessimistically) 
f
  9believe in a further price increase (decrease). Accordingly, their speculative demand is 
positive (negative). This simple yet elegant formulation goes back to Day and Huang 
(1990), and has been applied in a number of theoretical papers focussing on speculative 
dynamics. According to (12), rising prices lead to an increase in demand, i.e. the nature 
of (12) is indeed extrapolating. 
Speculative demand generated by the mean-reverting component is written as 
) ( t
R
t P P g D − = ,                                                                                                      (13) 
where   is a positive reaction parameter. For instance, if the housing price is below its 
fundamental value, agents using (13) expect a price risee and consequently increase 
their demand for houses. 
g
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where   and   stand for the impacts of the extrapolation and mean reversion 
demand components. Recall that the total demand for houses (2) now consists of real 
demand for houses (3), buffeted by speculative demand for houses (14). 
W W − 1
  How do agents choose between the two speculative demand strategies? In this 
paper, they update their behavior in every time step with respect to market 
circumstances. The relative impact of extrapolators is formalized as 







= ,                                                                                                 (15) 
where   is a positive parameter. The intuition behind the bell-shaped curve (15) is as 
follows. Agents seek to exploit price trends (i.e. bull and bear markets). However, the 
more the price deviates from its fundamental value, the more agents come to the 
conclusion that a fundamental market correction is about to set in, and they 
h
  10consequently switch to the mean reverting predictor. Note that the higher parameter  , 
the faster the agents abandon extrapolating behavior as the mispricing increases (i.e. the 




3.2 Dynamical system, fixed points and stability analysis 
The results we now present are derived in the appendix. Let us define  P Pt t − = π  and 
Z Zt t − = ζ . It is then possible to rewrite our model as a two-dimensional discrete-time 
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Hence, in order to compute trajectories for  t π  and  t ζ , an initial condition ( 0 π ,  0 ζ ) has 
to be specified. 
The dynamical system  (16) may have up to three fixed points. For π  we find 
0 1 = π                                                                                                                          (17) 
and 
)) )( 1 ( (
) )( 1 (
3 , 2 g c d e h
e c f d
+ − +
− − −
± = π .                                                                              (18) 
The denominator of (18) is always positive. The latter two fixed points thus only exist if 
 (implying a positive nominator). Hence, if the reaction parameter 
of the extrapolation rule exceeds a certain critical level, the model possesses three fixed 
points. The housing prices may then permanently be located above or below the 
fundamental steady state. For the model’s second state variable, we obtain 
0 ) 1 /( > − + > d e c f





= . Accordingly, the equilibrium supply of houses is relatively high 
(low) if the equilibrium housing price is located in the bull (bear) market. Should the 
price properly reflect its fundamental value, the supply of houses is as in section 3.1. 
    Moreover, it can be shown that the fixed point ( 0 1 = π ,  0 1 = ζ ) is locally 
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What is interesting here is that when the first inequality is violated, since   drops 
below a certain critical level (but the other two inequalities hold), we observe a 
(subcritical) flip bifurcation. When the second inequality is violated, since   increases 
(but the other two inequalities hold), we observe a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation. 
Finally, when the third inequality is violated, since   increases (but the other two 




Let us illustrate this interesting finding. Figure 1 shows four bifurcation 
diagrams in which we vary the bifurcation parameter   as indicated on the axis. The 
other parameters are given in table 1. The first panel reveals that the fundamental steady 
state becomes (locally) attracting if   becomes larger than 0.1. Hence, speculative 
forces have a stabilizing impact in this situation. 
f
f
---------- Table 1 goes about here ---------- 
  12However, the picture changes dramatically in the other bifurcation scenarios. 
The next two panels show the emergence of a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation. If   is 
about 0.933, the fundamental steady state loses its local asymptotical stability and two 
nonfundamental steady states appear in its place. The two bifurcation diagrams only 
differ with respect to the chosen initial conditions. Note that housing prices may 
persistently be higher (second panel) or lower (third panel) than the fundamental steady 
state. If   increases further, we observe cyclical or even chaotic price dynamics 
restricted to either the bull or the bear market. For   larger than about 4.5, we find that 
housing prices endogenously switch between bull and bear market regions (we will 





---------- Figure 1 goes about here ---------- 
The bottom panel depicts a supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. As   
exceeds the value of 0.953, the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and instead 
we observe quasi-periodic motion. Note that the amplitude of the price fluctuations 
increases with  . The bifurcation diagram also reveals some periodic windows and 
areas where the dynamics is apparently chaotic (the latter feature will also be revisited 
in the next subsection, jointly with figure 4). 
f
f
  It is also instructive to represent the region of local asymptotic stability of the 
fundamental steady state in the plane of the parameters   by taking the supply 
parameter   and the depreciation parameter 
) , ( f c
e ) 1 ( d −  as given. Parameters c and   are 
particularly important since our analysis stresses the joint effect of real and speculative 
demand. Note first that each of the three inequalities (19), (20), and (21) results in a 
half-plane in   parameter space. The straight lines which bound these half-planes 
f
) , ( f c
  13have identical slopes but different intercepts. We can thus easily identify two possible 
qualitative cases, which we denote as “Case 1” and “Case 2” in figure 2. Since   
and  , the inequalities 
0 > e
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1
  > −
d
 always hold. 
In the qualitative sketches of “Case 1” and “Case 2” it is assumed that parameters e and 





. The pictures would also 









, except that now the 
bottom line would lie entirely in the positive quadrant. 
However, the qualitative situation  ) 1 ( 2 d e + <  is particularly informative. In this 
case, an interval of positive values of parameter   exists such that (given the selected 
value of parameter e) the steady state of the model without speculation is stable. Such 
an interval, given as  , is represented in bold on the horizontal axis. In 
the opposite case, the model without speculative demand would be unstable for any 
value of c. 
c
)) 1 /( 2 , 0 ( d e + −
---------- Figure 2 goes about here ---------- 
Let us now compare “Case 1” with “Case 2”. The bifurcation scenario sketched 









,                                                                                                             (22) 
or, equivalently,  , where  ) 1 /(
2 δ δ − > e d − =1 : δ  is the depreciation rate. “Case 1” 
occurs, therefore, if the depreciation rate is small enough. In “Case 1” we observe a 
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation if the extrapolating component of the demand (governed by 
  14parameter  ) is sufficiently strong. However, it is also possible for a (subcritical) flip 
bifurcation to occur if parameter   becomes small enough (assuming that parameter c 
is outside the range of stability of the model with no speculative demand). The latter 
bifurcation can be regarded as the possibility that a sufficiently strong component of 
extrapolative demand stabilizes an otherwise unstable steady state via a reverse 
subcritical flip bifurcation.  
f
f
The above considerations about the Flip bifurcation also remain true in “Case 2”. 
However, in this scenario (which occurs if  , i.e. when the rate of 
depreciation is sufficiently high), there is no Neimark-Sacker bifurcation but a pitchfork 
bifurcation occurs instead when the speculative demand becomes strong enough. The 
latter gives rise to two further locally stable nonfundamental steady states. 
) 1 /(
2 δ δ − < e
 
3.3 Some numerical examples 
The goal of this subsection is to study the types of dynamic behavior our model may 
produce in greater detail. In particular, we will investigate two examples. The first 
example, given in figure 3, corresponds to the pitchfork bifurcation scenario depicted in 
the second and third panel of figure 1. In figure 3, we now assume  . The top panel 
shows housing prices in deviations from their fundamental value, whereas the bottom 
panel presents the stock of houses, also in terms of deviations from the fundamental 
steady state. As can be seen, our model is able to generate complex bull and bear market 
dynamics. Both housing prices and the stock of houses may fluctuate in an intricate 
manner for some time above their long-run steady state values. Then, however, out of 
the blue, housing markets crash, after which both variables fluctuate below their steady 
5 = f
  15state values. Note that the duration of bull and bear market episodes is quite 
unpredictable. 
---------- Figure 3 goes about here ---------- 
  A second example of intricate housing price cycles is given in figure 4. The 
underlying parameter setting is that used in the bottom panel of figure 1 with  , i.e. 
after the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. Now the dynamics is characterized by irregular 
bubbles and crashes. Housing prices may increase for a number of periods. At some 
point, however, a correction sets in, which usually leads to a severe crash. It is 
interesting to note that the model is able to generate boom and bust cycles with quite 
different appearances. Both the duration and amplitude of the cycles vary considerably. 
This is also mirrored in the development of the stock of houses. 
6 = f
---------- Figure 4 goes about here ---------- 
Recall that real home prices in London more than doubled from 1983 to 1988 
and then fell 47 percent by 1996. From 1996 to 2008, real home prices in London nearly 
tripled again. However, the latter development was briefly interrupted between mid-
2004 to mid-2005, when real home prices decreased by about 6 percent. This downturn 
was then quickly reversed with annual growth rates of 9 percent. According to Shiller 
(2007b), such irregularities in boom and bust cycles are hard to explain with standard 
economic thinking since one would expect a price dip to mark the end of a bubble and 
lead directly to a crash. We find it worthwhile to point out that our model may 
endogenously generate such price dynamics. 
In the panels of figure 5, we present from top to bottom  t π  ve sus t r  ζ ,  t π  
s  1 − t versu ζ , nd  t  a π  ver 1 − t sus π , respectively. The left-hand panels are based on the 
dynamics of figure 3 while the right-hand panels show the same for the dynamics of 
  16figure 4. The appearance of strange attractors underlines the complexity of the dynamics 
our model is able to produce. However, these panels also indicate a number of striking 
differences between the dynamics of figures 3 and 4. In all three panels on the left-hand 
side, we can make out a positive relation between the plotted variables, that is, we 
observe that prices tend to increase with the current and previous period’s stock of 
houses and that prices display some kind of persistence (i.e. high prices tend to be 
followed by high prices, and likewise for low prices). With respect to the persistence of 
prices, we find a similar effect on the right-hand side. However, the relation between the 
price of houses and stock of houses is negative for the dynamics discussed in figure 4. 
---------- Figure 5 goes about here ---------- 
  Let us finally try to sketch the events that may drive housing price bubbles. 
Suppose, for instance, that prices are slightly above the fundamental value. Then the 
majority of agents is optimistic and expects a price increase. As a result, demand for 
houses increases and prices are pushed upwards for a certain period. During this 
process, however, the market appears to be increasingly overvalued and agents start to 
switch to mean reversion expectations. Then some kind of adjustment towards the 
fundamental value sets in. If this adjustment is rather strong, we may even observe a 
crash. Otherwise, the rally continues after the price dip. Of course, the real part of the 
model also impacts on the dynamics. As long as housing prices are high, new 
constructions increase the stock of houses. During a downwards movement, however, 
the demand for houses may be considerably lower than the supply of houses, amplifying 
any price reduction. This story is in line with the conclusion of Shiller (2008), who 
argues that there has been a tendency in many cities for home prices to rise and crash, 
but to show little long-term trend. Prices rise while people are optimistic, but forces are 
  17set in motion for them to crash when they get too high. In our model, these forces 
contain a speculative component (dominance of regressive expectations) as well as a 
real component (excess supply of houses). 
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper we develop a simple model of a speculative housing market to improve our 
understanding of boom and bust housing prices cycles. The key feature of our model is 
that the demand for houses is affected by speculative forces. While some agents are 
convinced that housing prices converge towards their long-run fundamental value, other 
agents optimistically (pessimistically) believe in the persistence of bull and bear market 
dynamics. Since agents change their prediction strategies from time to time with respect 
to market circumstances, our model is nonlinear. We find that such speculative forces 
may imply the coexistence of (strange) attractors, and can lead to complex price 
dynamics. In particular, our model has the potential to generate intricate bubbles and 
crashes, as observed recently in many housing price markets around the world. 
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  20Appendix 
In this appendix, we derive the two-dimensional nonlinear dynamical system of the full 
model, its fixed points, the parameter space for which the model’s fundamental steady 
state is locally asymptotically stable, and necessary conditions for the emergence of a 
flip, a pitchfork, and a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, respectively. A theoretical treatment 
of linear and nonlinear dynamical systems is provided by Gandolfo (2002) and Medio 
and Lines (2001), among others. 
Note first that, using the auxiliary variables  P Pt t − = π  and  Z Zt t − = ζ , the 
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Hence, the dynamics of our model is driven by the iteration of a first-order system in 
) , ( t t ζ π . 
By inserting  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 ζ π ζ π ζ π = = + + t t t t  into (A3), the fixed points  
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 1 = ζ π                                                                                                           (A4) 
and 
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can be calculated. Since the denominator of  3 , 2 π  is always positive, the fixed points 
) , ( 3 , 2 3 , 2 ζ π  only exist if  0 ) )( 1 ( > − − − e c f d . 
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where  f d e c tr + + − − =1  and  ) 1 ( det f c d + − =  stand for the trace and determinant 
of  , respectively. Necessary and sufficient conditions which guarantee that a fixed 
point of a two-dimensional nonlinear map is locally asymptotically stable are (i) 
, (ii)   and (iii) 
J
0 det 1 > + +tr 0 det 1 > + −tr 0 det 1 > − , respectively. After some simple 





















c f .                                                                                                           (A9) 
Observe that for  0 = f , (A7) to (A9) are identical to (9) to (11). In this case, (A8) and 
(A9) would always be fulfilled. For  , however, (A7) is less restrictive than (9), 
while (A8) and (A9) impose additional stability restrictions. Note also that (A7)-(A9) 
are independent of parameters   and h. 
0 > f
b
  22Violation of the first, second and third inequality (the remaining two inequalities 
hold) represents a necessary condition for the emergence of a flip, pitchfork and 
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, respectively. In connection with supporting numerical 
evidence, this is usually regarded as strong evidence. Figure 1 furthermore reveals that 
the flip bifurcation is of the subcritical case whereas the pitchfork and Neimark-Sacker 
bifurcations are of the supercritical type. 
  23Scenario  c d e f g h 
Flip 0.1  0.5  3  -  1  1 
Pitchfork  0.6 0.7 0.1  5  1.5  1 
Neimark-Sacker  0.9 0.95 0.5  6  0.3  1 
 
Table 1: Parameter settings for numerical results. 
 
  24Captions for figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Bifurcation scenarios. The first panel shows a (subcritical) flip bifurcation, the 
second and third panels show a (supercritical) pitchfork bifurcation for two different 
sets of initial conditions, and the bottom panel shows a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. 
Parameter setting as in table 1, except that parameter f is varied as indicated on the axis. 
 
Figure 2: Representations of local asymptotic stability regions of the ‘fundamental 
steady state’ in the plane of the parameters  , taking supply parameter   and 
depreciation parameter   as given. The left (right) panel depicts “Case 1” (“Case 
2”), i.e. a situation where the rate of depreciation is relatively low (high). 
) , ( f c e
) 1 ( d −
 
Figure 3: Examples of persistent bull and bear market dynamics. The top panel shows 
the evolution of housing prices and the bottom panel presents the development of the 
stock of houses (both in deviations from the fundamental steady state). The parameter 
setting corresponds to the pitchfork bifurcation scenario, as indicated in table 1. 
 
Figure 4: Examples of bubbles and crashes. The top panel shows the evolution of 
housing prices and the bottom panel presents the development of the stock of houses 
(both in deviations from the fundamental steady state). The parameter setting 
corresponds to the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation scenario, as indicated in table 1. 
 
Figure 5: Emergence of strange attractors. In the panels from top to bottom, we plot  t π  
versus  t ζ ,  t π  versus  1 − t ζ , and  t π  versus  1 − t π , respectively. The left-hand panels are 
based on the dynamics of figure 2, whereas the right-hand panels belong to the 
dynamics reported in figure 3. 
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